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“I AM UNDOCUMENTED AND A NEW YORKER”:  
AFFIRMATIVE CITY CITIZENSHIP 
AND NEW YORK CITY’S 
IDNYC PROGRAM 
Amy C. Torres* 
 
The power to confer legal citizenship status is possessed solely by the 
federal government.  Yet the courts and legal theorists have demonstrated 
that citizenship encompasses factors beyond legal status, including rights, 
inclusion, and political participation.  As a result, even legal citizens can face 
barriers to citizenship, broadly understood, due to factors including their 
race, class, gender, or disability. Given this multidimensionality, the city, as 
the place where residents carry out the tasks of their daily lives, is a critical 
space for promoting elements of citizenship. 
This Note argues that recent city municipal identification-card programs 
have created a new form of citizenship for their residents.  This citizenship, 
which this Note terms “Affirmative City Citizenship,” is significant for both 
marginalized populations generally, as well as undocumented immigrant city 
residents who, because of their noncitizen legal status, face additional 
hurdles to city life.  Utilizing “IDNYC”—New York City’s municipal 
identification-card program—as a case study, this Note examines the 
strengths and limitations of Affirmative City Citizenship as a means for 
supporting undocumented immigrant city residents.  It concludes that while 
Affirmative City Citizenship is a powerful tool for confronting barriers to 
citizenship, its success with the immigrant population relies in part on the 
city’s adoption of other proimmigrant policies that more directly conflict with 
federal law. Accordingly, it recommends that cities seeking to protect their 
undocumented immigrant city residents adopt both types of policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a day like this:  you wake up in the morning to a text from your 
daughter saying that she forgot her school project at home and asking you to 
bring it to her.  You hurry to get dressed and walk to your daughter’s school, 
flashing your identification card as you run past the building’s security to get 
your daughter her poster board before second period.  After you hand it off, 
you head to the local library where you use that same identification card to 
reserve time on the computer and borrow a few books on English and 
cooking.  You are currently working at a local restaurant but have dreams of 
becoming a chef or starting your own restaurant.  Studying at the library has 
become a ritual of yours now that your children are in school and you have 
spare time. 
After the library, you head to city hall where you again show your 
identification card before entering a public forum.  At the forum, you speak 
out against the recent use of trains for the transportation of potentially 
explosive chemicals by your apartment in Queens.  On your way home, you 
witness a hit-and-run and you call 911.  When the police arrive, they question 
you about what you saw, noting that you were the only witness nearby and 
warning that you may be called in to testify.  You do not hesitate to share 
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your contact information and identification card with them, and you assure 
them that you are more than willing to help. 
Finally, imagine that in addition to all of this, you are an undocumented 
immigrant.  You have been in the United States for almost fifteen years, yet 
your presence in the United States is not authorized by law and you are 
subject to deportation at any time.  Your undocumented status and lack of 
right to remain in the United States are realities that never escape you.  Yet, 
reflecting on your day, you also recognize that in the city in which you 
reside—the city that never asked about your legal status before issuing you a 
city identification card—your presence is valid.  You still eagerly await a 
time when your presence will become lawful and you will not have to live in 
fear.  You know that nothing but legal status can change that.  Still, you 
appreciate that, in your city, you do not have to hide while you wait. 
In January 2015, New York City launched the IDNYC program, making a 
New York City identification card available to all city residents irrespective 
of legal immigration status in the United States.1  The card provides its 
holders access to city services and buildings; functions as a library card; and 
is considered a valid form of identification by the New York City Police 
Department, city health care centers and hospitals, and select banking 
institutions.2  New York City is not the first city to develop a municipal 
identification program, and it is not the last.  Since its launch, similar 
programs have either been implemented or considered in various cities across 
the country.3  By facilitating access to the agencies and businesses with which 
city residents are likely to interact, these cards present a creative way to 
address some of the challenges posed by federal immigration law for 
undocumented immigrants.4 
 
 1. See Matt Flegenheimer, New York City to Formally Start Its Municipal ID Card 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/nyregion/new-
york-city-to-formally-start-its-municipal-id-card-program.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/S3CC-CJJY].  
 2. The first municipal city identification program was launched in New Haven, 
Connecticut, in 2007. See CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, WHO WE ARE:  MUNICIPAL ID 
CARDS AS A LOCAL STRATEGY TO PROMOTE BELONGING AND SHARED COMMUNITY IDENTITY 
11 (2013), https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/municipal%20id%20report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8BK-GXRL].  Today, similar programs exist in cities in California, New 
Jersey, and the District of Columbia. Id.  
 3. Interview with Sam Solomon, Deputy Dir. of Policy, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of 
Immigrant Affairs, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Oct. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Solomon Interview] (on file 
with the author). 
 4. See, e.g., Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace:  The Fallacy of Labor 
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2001) (arguing 
that despite the existence of some federal legal protections for undocumented immigrant 
laborers, undocumented immigrants lack meaningful remedies for labor exploitation and are 
vulnerable to deportation if they assert their protected rights); see also Christopher Choe, 
Bringing in the Unbanked off the Fringe:  The Bank On San Francisco Model and the Need 
for Public and Private Partnership, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 365, 384 (2009) (noting that 
undocumented immigrants are less likely than other populations to use mainstream banking 
out of fear of deportation, resulting in their having to pay higher costs for basic financial 
services). 
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IDNYC, however, was not designed solely for the benefit of the city’s 
undocumented immigrant population.5  The program’s legislative history 
reveals that the lack of valid identification was a widespread problem that 
affected many groups, including the city’s homeless, elderly, youth, and 
LQBTQ populations.6  In this way, IDNYC aims to do more than just defend 
against the consequences of federal immigration law for city communities.7  
By treating undocumented status as merely one of many factors inhibiting a 
New Yorker from being able to fully engage with the city’s services and 
institutions, IDNYC challenges the traditional role cities play in the 
citizenship of their residents.  While the federal monopoly over immigration 
and citizenship is well settled,8 significant legal scholarship asserts that 
citizenship as a legal concept encompasses factors that go beyond federally 
bestowed legal status, including a sense of belonging or an ability to 
participate fully in society.9  The multidimensionality of citizenship, in turn, 
hints that actors other than the federal government can and do play a legally 
permissible role in citizenship enhancement. 
This Note argues that city municipal identification-card programs present 
a new role for the city in citizenship.  While city legislation or policy relating 
to immigration is not a new phenomenon,10 municipal identification-card 
programs differ from other city policies.  They do not seek to bolster, or resist, 
existing federal immigration laws.  Instead, cities that adopt these policies 
take on an affirmative role, aiming to remove barriers to citizenship for all 
their residents, including undocumented immigrants.  In this way, cities 
bestow a new form of citizenship, which this Note terms “Affirmative City 
Citizenship,” on those within their territorial boundaries.11  While 
Affirmative City Citizenship is neither a substitute for a federally recognized 
citizenship status nor without limitations,12 it can nevertheless have powerful 
impacts on the undocumented immigrant population. 
To articulate this theory of Affirmative City Citizenship, this Note 
proceeds in four Parts.  Part I discusses citizenship as a multidimensional 
phenomenon and the central importance of the city as the place where many 
of the dimensions of citizenship are realized.  Next, Part II examines barriers 
to citizenship in the city, beginning with a discussion of vulnerable 
 
 5. See Solomon Interview, supra note 3. 
 6. See N.Y.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON IMMIGRATION, COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, at 3–4 (2014) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT], 
http://www.legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3059634&GUID=63E7AD26-
877A-4D95-A053-1237DB1571B0 [https://perma.cc/KYT9-QVWJ]. 
 7. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 8. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“The federal power to 
determine immigration policy is well settled.”). 
 9. See, e.g., LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:  DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 27 (2006) (articulating a broader theory of “citizenship as 
membership” which encompasses “[s]tatus, rights, political engagement and identity”). 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. Affirmative City Citizenship is not a substitute for formal legal status.  This Note does 
not argue that local governments can effectively replace formal legal status or render the need 
for federally developed legal pathways to citizenship any less important. 
 12. See infra Part IV.B. 
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populations generally and then turning to look at the case of undocumented 
immigrants specifically.  Part III considers city responses to these challenges, 
briefly examining sanctuary city policies and then analyzes New York City’s 
IDNYC program.  Finally, Part IV articulates a theory of Affirmative City 
Citizenship, exploring its strengths and potential challenges.  This Note 
concludes that while municipal identification programs can remove barriers 
to citizenship for constituents, their success among undocumented 
immigrants relies in part on a coexistence with other proimmigrant policies 
that do directly conflict with federal immigration law.  Therefore, this Note 
recommends that cities seeking to support their undocumented immigrant 
residents adopt municipal identification-card programs together with 
sanctuary city policies. 
I.  CITIZENSHIP AND THE CITY 
Throughout American legal history, the judiciary has treated citizenship 
differently in different contexts.13  As a result, the meaning of citizenship and 
the privileges and rights associated with it are more contested than 
acknowledged.14  Part I.A provides an overview of the different theories of 
citizenship as articulated by courts and scholars of citizenship.  Part I.B then 
demonstrates that citizenship is multidimensional and encompasses elements 
beyond formal legal status.  Next, Part I.C discusses the contemporary role 
that cities play in the lives of American residents.  Part I.D concludes with a 
presentation of cities as spaces where residents exercise many of the rights 
and privileges inherent in citizenship. 
A.  Citizenship as Legal Status 
In U.S. immigration law, the term “citizen” refers to a legal status 
bestowed onto nonnatives by the federal government for which attainment is 
most commonly associated with the right to vote in federal elections.15  In 
addition to voting rights, legal citizenship is also required to run for public 
office, to become eligible for most federal jobs, and to receive priority when 
petitioning to bring family members to the United States.16  Only U.S. 
citizens can obtain citizenship for children born outside of the United States 
or obtain a U.S. passport, which is a prerequisite for receiving assistance from 
the U.S. government while traveling abroad.17  The federal government also 
 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. Even one of the most central elements of modern-day citizenship—its association with 
the nation-state—is contested by citizenship scholars. See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note 9, at 5 
(“Citizenship’s intimate relationship to the nation-state is not intrinsic but contingent and 
historical, and the forms and locations of citizenship, as we conventionally understand the 
term, are more varied than ordinarily acknowledged.”); see also Monica Varsanyi, 
Interrogating “Urban Citizenship” Vis-à-Vis Undocumented Migration, 10 CITIZENSHIP 
STUD. 229, 229–30 (2006). 
 15. What Are the Benefits and Responsibilities of Citizenship?, USCIS, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8GY-
E4WS] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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grants others forms of lawful status to noncitizens, including lawful 
permanent residence, or green cards,18 and temporary work and student 
visas.19 
The power to confer or deny national citizenship is derived from Article I, 
Section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution, which entrusts Congress with the 
power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”20  This power is 
unique to the federal government and courts have consistently been unwilling 
to scrutinize Congress or the executive branch’s decisions in this area.21  The 
U.S. Supreme Court first articulated this high level of deference in 1889 in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.22  Chae Chan Ping involved a challenge 
to the federal government’s decision to retroactively prohibit a Chinese 
laborer who had gone abroad from returning to the United States.23  The 
Court upheld the federal government’s denial of reentry, even though such a 
policy conflicted with the terms of an international treaty, stating that the 
national government’s right to exclude foreigners was “an incident of 
sovereignty” and a power that “cannot be granted away or restrained on 
behalf of any one.”24 
Despite this unquestioned authority to grant and deny lawful immigration 
status, the same deference has not been applied toward the federal 
government’s treatment of noncitizens already residing in the United 
States.25  An early example of this contrast is the Supreme Court’s 1896 
decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,26 where the Court held that Chinese 
immigrants had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a local 
ordinance on equal protection grounds, even though they were noncitizens.27 
Ten years later, in Wong Wing v. United States,28 the Court also rejected the 
federal government’s argument that it could imprison Chinese laborers for 
violations of immigration law without a trial by jury as a result of their illegal 
entry into the country.29  The rights of noncitizens have been reaffirmed as 
recently as 1982 when the Court decided in Plyer v. Doe30 that a Texas law 
 
 18. Lawful Permanent Residents, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/lawful-permanent-residents 
[https://perma.cc/SLB8-UJMU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 19. Nonimmigrant Classes of Admission, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/nonimmigrant/NonimmigrantCOA 
[https://perma.cc/8MYJ-Z3R5] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 21. A recent affirmation of this federal power can be found in Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 22. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 23. Id. at 623–24. 
 24. Id. at 609.  
 25. See BOSNIAK, supra note 9, at 55. 
 26. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 27. Id. at 369 (describing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as “universal in 
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality”).  
 28. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 29. Id. at 238. 
 30. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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denying public education to undocumented immigrant children was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.31 
Courts’ inconsistent treatment of the federal government’s ability to deny 
citizenship or lawful status,32 on the one hand, and to treat noncitizens 
differently,33 on the other, demonstrates that, in the legal context, the term 
“citizen” encompasses more than federal status.  In The Citizen and the Alien, 
Linda Bosniak reconciles this disparate treatment by arguing that citizenship 
in the United States is a “hybrid legal category” that crosses over into two 
distinct legal domains.34  The first, “membership in the national community,” 
includes the federal government’s power to admit or exclude immigrants into 
the United States and its power to deport those unlawfully present, both of 
which are broad.35  The second domain, the “rights of persons,” includes the 
federal government’s ability to regulate the daily lives of undocumented 
immigrants residing in the United States, which she argues is much more 
limited.36 
B.  Multidimensional Citizenship 
Bosniak’s “hybrid legal category” theory has broader implications for 
understanding citizenship.  If undocumented immigrants present in the 
United States are entitled to basic constitutional protections even as 
noncitizens, it follows that only some of the rights and privileges associated 
with a U.S. residence are tied to the legal title of “citizen.”37  In other words, 
while the American understanding of citizenship undoubtedly encompasses 
a federally recognized legal status, it also encompasses other rights and 
privileges that could exist regardless of one’s federal immigration status. 
Support for a multidimensional understanding of citizenship comes from 
the well-documented struggles of certain groups, such as minorities or people 
with disabilities, to exercise rights typically associated with citizenship 
despite their status as citizens.38  There have also been instances where those 
 
 31. Id. at 202. 
 32. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 33. See, e.g., Plyer, 457 U.S. at 210. 
 34. BOSNIAK, supra note 9, at 39. 
 35. Id. at 13–14. 
 36. Id. at 14; see also infra Part III.B. 
 37. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS:  THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS 107, 275 (2005) (chronicling how a group of undocumented immigrants in the Long 
Island suburbs, through effective organizing, “acted in the way citizens act, and changed the 
law”). 
 38. See, e.g., Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies Through the Lens of 
Disability, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1497–98 (2016) (detailing the different challenges people 
with disabilities in the United States face when voting, including transportation, polling 
facility inadequacies, and insensitive poll workers); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral 
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1291 
(2004) (stating that the mass incarceration of African American males in the United States 
“dramatically constrains the participation of African American communities in the mainstream 
political economy”); Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (arguing that the treatment of the urban poor is so mired with 
discrimination and limited access to education and housing opportunities as to constitute a 
violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment); see also Rose Cuison Villazor, 
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without legal status have successfully exercised some of citizenship’s rights 
and privileges.39  In Suburban Sweatshops:  The Fight for Immigrant Rights, 
Professor Jennifer Gordon chronicles the efforts of a group of immigrants, 
including undocumented immigrants, to combat labor exploitation and 
abusive working conditions in the Long Island suburbs.40  She examines how 
the group successfully drafted and lobbied for what became the first law in 
the nation to drastically raise the sanctions against employers for failing to 
pay earned wages.41  Their story demonstrates that “the right to seek social 
change through the political process” is one that, although seemingly central 
to modern notions of citizenship, can successfully be exercised by 
immigrants without formal status.42 
In sum, the barriers that some legal citizens face in exercising elements of 
citizenship43 and the ability of noncitizens to exercise elements of citizenship 
without legal status44 both demonstrate that citizenship in practice entails 
more than federal legal status.  It follows, then, that actors other than the 
federal government can play a role in enhancing or inhibiting a U.S. 
resident’s ability to exercise the rights and privileges associated with, but not 
conferred by, traditional conceptions of citizenship. 
C.  The City as the Overseer of Daily Life 
Much has been written about the role of cities in progressive policy-
making,45 but exploring this role requires an understanding of the reach and 
limits of city power.  Cities today are empowered through the home rule 
doctrine to oversee the majority of functions and services relied upon by their 
residents on a daily basis.46  Under the home rule doctrine, local governments 
derive their power from the states through “a state legislative provision or 
action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional 
on its acceptance of certain terms.”47  Developed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the home rule movement marked a significant 
departure from the then-existing “Dillon’s Rule,” under which municipalities 
 
American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1673, 1712 (2017) 
(“[T]here are certain rights that are enjoyed by all persons regardless of citizenship.”). 
 39. See GORDON, supra note 37, at 298. 
 40. Id. at 3–5. 
 41. Id. at 277. 
 42. Id. at 278. 
 43. See, e.g., Belt, supra note 38, at 1497–98. 
 44. See GORDON, supra note 37, at 278. 
 45. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 
1, 2 (2006) (characterizing reforms adopted by San Francisco and New York City in the early 
2000s as “illustrative of a broader phenomenon—political innovation and reform at the local 
level”); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives:  What Is Motivating State 
and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About 
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016 (2006) (analyzing the 
significance of emerging state and local environmental law initiatives); Matthew J. Parlow, 
Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level:  Rethinking Traditional Notions of 
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 371, 375 (2008) (stating “local governments have 
led the way in many areas of public policy”). 
 46. See generally Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113 (2007). 
 47. Home Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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possessed only the powers expressly conferred onto them, much like 
corporations.48  Almost all states have adopted some form of the home rule 
doctrine49 and the home rule movement is seen as a legal recognition of the 
importance of city power and enhanced local autonomy.50  Today, while not 
sovereigns in their own right, cities possess significant power to govern 
matters of local concern.51 
Home rule doctrines vary across states.52  Nonetheless, most local 
governments have been granted power over most of the functions that have 
the greatest impact on the lives of their residents.53  As one scholar states, 
cities are responsible for the services “most vital to the preservation of 
life . . . liberty . . . property . . . and public enlightenment.”54  These include 
local police, fire, public health, local courts and prosecutors, street 
maintenance, trash collection and sanitation, zoning, taxing, education, and 
libraries.55  This also means that when things go wrong, city residents are 
more likely to turn to local leaders, converting city governments into “first 
responders.”56 
In addition to overseeing local activity, cities may also be uniquely 
positioned to confront the factors, such as discrimination and ignorance, that 
have historically created barriers to daily life for vulnerable populations.57  
Professor Gerald E. Frug, a legal scholar in local and city governments, 
argues that cities are different from any other entity because, unlike voluntary 
associations such as country clubs or church groups, cities attract diverse 
populations who are then forced to interact with each other in a shared 
 
 48. See Diller, supra note 46, at 1124. 
 49. New York State’s home rule doctrine, for example, is in Article IX of the State 
Constitution. N.Y. CONST. art. IX.  Section 1 establishes the premise that “[e]ffective local 
self-government and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the state,” 
N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, and grants local governments the power to adopt laws “in relation to 
its property, affairs, or government,” N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(b)(2).  Section 2 lists areas in 
which local governments may legislate, including the “government, protection, order, conduct, 
safety, health and well-being of persons or property within.” N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(10). 
 50. See Diller, supra note 46, at 1125. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally Darin M. Dalmat, Note, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home:  
The Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 93 (2005) (surveying home rule doctrines across the United States to assess which 
support local minimum wage laws).  
 53. See Diller, supra note 46, at 1127. 
 54. ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY:  THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SERVICES 10 (1977). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Parlow, supra note 45, at 373 (“In this regard, local governments can be viewed 
as perhaps the most critical level of government in terms of responding—through regulation, 
goods, or services—to the needs and wants of its constituents.”). 
 57. As an example of discrimination interfering with the daily life of city residents, in a 
federal district court certified a class of Black and Latino men in their suit alleging that they 
had been unlawfully stopped and frisked by New York City police officers without reasonable 
suspicion. See generally Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
There, the plaintiffs argued that unlawful police practices caused them harm and suffering, 
including having to live in fear of future stops. Id. at 412.  
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space.58  This “fortuitous association” makes the city ideally situated to 
promote the type of “community building” required to develop political 
solutions to divisiveness.59  As Frug states, cities “offer an opportunity to 
expand our capacity to understand, cope with, and, hopefully, enjoy the 
variety of people who live in America,” which he sees as vital to overcoming 
contemporary divisiveness.60 
D.  The City as Supporter of Democracy 
Beyond daily activities, cities also promote civic participation and foster 
the kind of experimentation required to help fundamental rights transition 
from ideals to practice, both of which are central to citizenship.61  When 
governance occurs in closer, more localized units, city residents are more 
inclined to be interested in politics because they are more likely to have 
access to information and to feel that they have a chance to influence the 
outcome of decisions.62  Thus, local governments promote civic participation 
in a way that state and federal governments cannot.63  As Frug states, “On a 
local level, democracy can be a lived experience . . . .  In a state or 
metropolitan region where millions of people live, popular control of public 
policy becomes more rhetorical than real.”64 
Cities are also central to converting rights from ideals to practice.  In their 
theory of democratic experimentalism, Professors Michael C. Dorf and 
Charles F. Sabel argue that the desire to see fundamental rights as inherent, 
regardless of circumstance, often obscures how even fundamental rights 
require adaptation to local circumstances before they can be fully realized.65  
Pointing to women’s rights as an example, they point out that even though 
women have been recognized as equal citizens for almost 100 years, litigation 
continues over policies for pregnancy in the workplace and the legality of all-
women’s colleges.66  According to Sabel and Dorf, experimentation on the 
local level is crucial because plaintiffs bring challenges to local courts for 
rights violations, and remedies are often crafted in consideration of local 
circumstances.67  This kind of adaptation occurs even if the rights themselves 
stem from federal laws but would not be possible at the state or federal 
level.68 
 
 58. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35 (1998) (“Cities are 
characterized . . . by the wide variety of different kinds of people who live in them:  gay and 
straight, cosmopolitan and streetwise, elderly and college grad, Latino and Anglo, office 
employee and service worker.”). 
 59. Id. at 37. 
 60. Id. at 36. 
 61. See Diller, supra note 46, at 1128. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Gerald E. Frug, The Central-Local Relationship, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 2 
(2014). 
 65. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 66. Id. at 450–51. 
 67. Id. at 316. 
 68. Id. at 314–15. 
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Thus, as overseer of daily activity, promoter of civic participation, and 
supporter of fundamental rights, the city is well positioned to promote many 
of the dimensions of citizenship beyond legal status.  Yet various city 
residents continue to face impediments to exercising these elements of 
citizenship. 
II.  BARRIERS TO CITIZENSHIP 
Many different marginalized and vulnerable groups are unable to exercise 
dimensions of citizenship.  Part II begins with a discussion of barriers to 
citizenship for a variety of vulnerable groups and then turns to the special 
case of undocumented immigrants. 
A.  Vulnerable Groups Generally 
Academic scholars across fields argue that factors such as bias, 
discrimination, and special circumstances operate to deny different 
vulnerable or marginalized populations some of the rights and privileges to 
which they are equally entitled.69  Several examples illustrated below 
demonstrate how elements of city life continue to marginalize certain groups, 
including racial and ethnic minorities, women, and people with disabilities. 
Despite possessing the legal right to vote, some groups face challenges to 
participation in the political process.  Throughout American history, various 
groups including African Americans have struggled to exercise their voting 
rights even after becoming legally entitled to them.70  Legal scholars maintain 
that certain groups continue to face barriers to political participation.  One 
such group is disabled Americans, who remain challenged by poorly selected 
voting locations with limited wheelchair accessibility, inadequate voting 
technology, and ignorant election officials, despite legislative efforts aimed 
at improving access.71  Another scholar has shown that minority voters are 
more likely than white voters to move close to voter registration deadlines, 
thus missing their chance to vote in an election.72 
Racial profiling and discrimination also inhibit certain minority groups 
from fully participating in American society.  For instance, in a recent class 
action lawsuit certified against the New York City Police Department, 
African American and Latino plaintiffs argued that the city’s stop and frisk 
procedures caused them to live in fear.73  The mass incarceration of African 
Americans is another example because, not only are incarcerated African 
Americans unable to live as free citizens while in jail, but their opportunities 
 
 69. See, e.g., Belt, supra note 38, at 1497–98; Roberts, supra note 38, at 1291; Sidhu, 
supra note 38, at 2. 
 70. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, Major Dates in History, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/timelines/history-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/HM2J-PYSK] (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (describing the history of legislation meant to ensure “the right to vote 
is not denied on account of race or color”). 
 71. See Belt, supra note 38, at 1497–1504. 
 72. Andrea M. Lee, Don’t Save the Date:  How More Restrictive State Voter Registration 
Deadlines Disenfranchise Minority Movers, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 245, 248 (2010). 
 73. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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for economic advancement are often foreclosed by their criminal record upon 
exiting.74 
B.  The Special Case of Undocumented Immigrants 
In addition to the above challenges shared by citizens and noncitizens 
alike, undocumented immigrants face hurdles to city life that stem uniquely 
from their unlawful status.  Part II.B turns to a discussion of these hurdles, 
explaining how limited legal protections, an emerging role for local actors in 
the enforcement of federal immigration law, and the rise in local immigration 
legislation combine to create additional challenges to city life for 
undocumented immigrant residents. 
1.  The Consequences of Undocumented Status 
Undocumented immigrants share similar impediments with their citizen-
neighbors and encounter others that uniquely stem from their lack of lawful 
presence.75  There are an estimated 11.1 million undocumented immigrants 
living in the United States today who can be deported by the federal 
government at any time.76  While undocumented immigrants do not possess 
any of the rights or privileges that accompany legal U.S. citizenship,77 the 
Supreme Court has recognized that undocumented immigrants are “persons” 
under the Constitution, entitled to both equal protection and due process of 
law.78 
Beyond these constitutional protections, federal law makes undocumented 
immigrants ineligible for many federal public service programs, including 
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and nonemergency 
Medicaid, empowering state and local governments to do the same.79  
Additionally, even though undocumented immigrants constitute 
approximately five percent of the United States workforce,80 it remains 
 
 74. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 1293.  
 75. As discussed in Part I.B, citizenship is a multidimensional phenomenon that 
encompasses factors beyond legal status.  Once that is understood, it is tempting to view 
undocumented status as merely one of many factors that can hinder citizenship.  However, as 
Bosniak points out, the “hybrid legal status” of being undocumented is distinct from other 
forms of disadvantage because, unlike race or class, the federal government can lawfully 
discriminate based on legal status. See BOSNIAK, supra note 9, at 38.  Thus, the relationship 
between undocumented status and U.S. citizenship is unique.  
 76. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population Stable for Half 
a Decade, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/ 
unauthorized-immigrant-population-stable-for-half-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/5RU6-
ZW24].  An estimated 850,000 undocumented immigrants currently reside in New York State. 
See Profile of the Unauthorized Population:  New York, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2015), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/NY 
[https://perma.cc/UC5F-DX9Z]. 
 77. See supra Part I.A. 
 78. See supra Part I.A. 
 79. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1995). 
 80. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/03/5-facts-about-
illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/8AKN-8Q8M].  
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illegal to hire them, and those who are employed enjoy fewer federal 
workplace protections than their lawfully present coworkers.81 
Although all states have the same power to regulate the health, safety, and 
welfare of their residents, they have made very different decisions about what 
rights to grant undocumented residents.82  For example, in New York State, 
undocumented immigrants have a right to emergency hospital care, worker’s 
compensation, labor protections, state public benefits, and in-state tuition at 
the State University of New York so long as they attended a New York high 
school for at least two years.83  By contrast, in Ohio, undocumented 
immigrant residents are not eligible for in-state tuition, scholarships, or state 
driver’s licenses, and are not named as eligible for worker’s compensation.84  
Under Ohio’s public health system, undocumented children are not entitled 
to health insurance, and Medicaid is not available to undocumented pregnant 
women.85 
An obvious alternative to living with an undocumented status would be to 
undergo the naturalization process and become a U.S. citizen.  However, 
since 1986,86 the federal government has failed to pass comprehensive 
immigration reform (CIR) or legislation providing for visas, paths to 
citizenship, and enforcement mechanisms,87 essentially foreclosing the 
opportunity for today’s undocumented immigrants to naturalize.88  There are 
 
 81. While in the past workplace rights were frequently extended to undocumented 
immigrants, the Supreme Court weakened those protections when it held that undocumented 
immigrants were not entitled to monetary compensation after being illegally fired for 
supporting a union. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
 82. See, e.g., Haeyoun Park, Which States Make Life Easier or Harder for Illegal 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/ 
30/us/laws-affecting-unauthorized-immigrants.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/66YT-KM2V]. 
 83. See James L. Seward, What Benefits Can Illegal Aliens Receive?, N.Y. ST. SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/articles/james-l-seward/what-benefits-can-illegal-
aliens-receive [https://perma.cc/35U6-7N4T]. 
 84. MICHAEL A. RODRIGUEZ ET AL., GLOB. HEALTH INST., UNIV. OF CAL., CREATING 
CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT HEALTHY PEOPLE:  STATE POLICIES THAT AFFECT THE HEALTH OF 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 8 (2015), http://healthpolicy.ucla.edu/ 
publications/Documents/PDF/2015/immigrantreport-apr2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8AD-
V953]. 
 85. Id.  
 86. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) included provisions 
prohibiting the hiring of illegal immigrants and employer sanctions, and it also legalized 
groups of undocumented immigrants provided they met certain criteria regarding length of 
residency, lack of criminal background, and an admission of guilt. See generally Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 87. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/comprehensive-immigration-reform 
[https://perma.cc/R8LE-3VJT] (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (describing CIR as legislation that 
“would marry increased border enforcement with legalization for unauthorized immigrants 
and the ability to bring in future workers needed by the U.S. labor market”). 
 88. The last CIR bill proposed was the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act, which included provisions for enhanced border protection as 
well as a means for undocumented immigrants to legalize after a ten-year probationary period 
known as “Registered Provisional Immigrant” status. See Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2101 (as passed by 
Senate, June 27, 2013); see also S. REP. NO. 113-40, at 83–86 (2013).  The bill passed the 
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many reasons attributed to the government’s inaction.  Some argue that the 
federal government’s refusal to address illegal immigration is motivated by 
the economic benefits it derives from exploiting undocumented immigrant 
labor,89 while others take a more neutral position, asserting that the national 
sentiment toward immigration is simply too politically polarized to ever 
achieve national consensus.90  Regardless of the justification, Congress’s 
inability to pass CIR has, until recently, coincided with a steady increase in 
the number of undocumented immigrants in the country—a rising share of 
whom have lived in the United States for at least ten years.91 
2.  The Shift to Local Immigration Law Enforcement 
Despite the failure of CIR, Congress has passed immigration-related 
legislation since 1986, but its focus has been on creating an increasingly 
enhanced role for state and local actors in immigration enforcement.92  
Following Congress’s lead, the executive branch has also developed 
programs and authorized activity that empowered local actors to enforce civil 
and criminal immigration law.93 
Congress first called on local cooperation in 1996 with the passage of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA).94  IIRIRA expanded the role of local and state officials in 
enforcing federal immigration law in three ways.  First, it added a provision 
to immigration law permitting the Attorney General to empower local 
officials to enforce civil immigration laws whenever there was “an actual or 
 
Senate on June 27, 2013, but died shortly thereafter when the House of Representatives refused 
to consider it. See Philip E. Wolgin, 2 Years Later, Immigrants Are Still Waiting on 
Immigration Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2015/06/24/115835/2-years-
later-immigrants-are-still-waiting-on-immigration-reform/ [https://perma.cc/S8QB-LQK3]. 
 89. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 590 (2008) (“The federal government is therefore walking 
the line between giving full effect to the limitations it has set on immigrant admissions and 
thwarting the decisions and preferences of U.S. consumers, whose market preferences have 
helped give rise to the unauthorized population.”). 
 90. See generally S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance 
of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431 (2012). 
 91. In 1990, there were an estimated 3.5 million undocumented immigrants living in the 
United States, whereas today that number is closer to 11.3 million. See Krogstad et al., supra 
note 80.  For an interesting discussion into potential causes for this increase, see generally 
Daniel Griswold, Comprehensive Immigration Reform:  What Congress and the President 
Need to Do to Make It Work, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. ix (2010).  Griswold contends that the 
federal government’s failure to pass CIR and its focus on enforcement has actually contributed 
to the growth of the undocumented immigrant population in the United States in two ways. Id. 
at xiv.  First, harsher enforcement at the border has diverted smuggling routes to more remote 
areas which are, in turn, harder to police. Id. at xv.  Second, the more difficult it becomes for 
immigrants to enter the country illegally, the more likely they are to stay once in the United 
States since they understand that if they leave again, they may not be able to return. Id. at xvi.  
 92. See Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws:  The New Immigration Federalism, 
2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1205–1206. 
 93. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 598 (2012). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 and 18 U.S.C.). 
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imminent mass influx of aliens . . . requiring an immediate Federal 
response.”95  Second, it added section 287(g) to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, empowering trained local law enforcement officers to 
enforce federal immigration law.96  Finally, it prohibited states and localities 
from barring employees from reporting immigration status data to the federal 
government.97 
That same year, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which denied noncitizens public 
benefits and explicitly authorized state and local officials to do the same.98  
This act increased the burden on local actors because its passage meant that 
social service, healthcare, and education workers who provided federal 
services were also expected to verify immigration statuses and share that 
information with the federal government.99  Congress also passed the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,100 which included a 
provision that authorized state officers to arrest and detain noncitizens who 
had “previously been convicted of a felony in the United States.”101  While 
some localities have nonetheless enacted local laws to protect the information 
of their undocumented residents,102 these federal laws at a minimum marked 
an ideological shift among national legislators that local actors had a role to 
play in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.103 
After September 11, 2001, the executive branch picked up where Congress 
left off, further empowering local actors through three main acts.  First, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a revised memorandum stating that 
state and local officials had inherent authority to arrest and detain violators 
 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2012). 
 96. Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 133, 110 Stat. at 3009-563 
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 99. Jennifer Ridgley, Cities of Refuge:  Immigration Enforcement, Police, and the 
Insurgent Genealogies of Citizenship in U.S. Sanctuary Cities, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 53, 61 
(2008). 
 100. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 42 U.S.C.). 
 101. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2012). 
 102. For example, New York City’s Executive Order No. 41, signed by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg on September 17, 2003, prohibits city agency employees from inquiring about the 
immigration status of their applicants unless such an inquiry is required by law or to determine 
eligibility for a particular program. OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., EXEC. ORDER 
NO. 41 (2003).  In addition, it prohibits city employees from disclosing confidential 
information, including immigration status, unless required by law or: 
In the case of information relating to immigration status, (i) the individual to whom 
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apprehend a person suspected of engaging in illegal activity, other than mere status 
as an undocumented alien or (iii) such disclosure is necessary in furtherance of an 
investigation of potential terrorist activity. 
Id. 
 103. See Ridgley, supra note 99, at 59. 
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of the immigration laws, including civil laws.104  Second, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS)105 began to enter various categories of civil 
immigration information into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
database, thereby providing law enforcement at various levels with the ability 
to access immigration information during routine police activity.106  Finally, 
the attorney general and his staff began to attend local meetings and 
informally encourage state and local law enforcement officials to take part in 
immigration law enforcement efforts.107 
In addition to these agency database and policy changes, perhaps the most 
controversial executive branch activity came from its development of two 
programs:  the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs.108  The 287(g) 
program was established by IIRIRA in 1996, but it was not until after 
September 11, 2001, that its provisions were first utilized.109  It authorizes 
local and state law enforcement agents to enter into agreements with the 
federal government by executing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).110  
Once an MOU is established, local police officially possess the authority not 
only to enforce criminal immigration law but also to enforce civil 
immigration law so long as the local actors agree to be trained and supervised 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).111 
As of August 2017, ICE has 287(g) agreements with sixty law enforcement 
agencies in eighteen states.112  Although historically there were three types 
of 287(g) agreements,113 all agreements in existence today fall under the “jail 
 
 104. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
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1776 (2015). 
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ineffective, criticisms that were later corroborated by the federal government itself. See U.S. 
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https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g [https://perma.cc/EQ92-AAHR] (last visited Sept. 21, 
2017). 
 113. See The 287(g) Program:  An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 2 (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/rresearc/the_287g_program_
an_overview_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/29T4-CSMW].  
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enforcement model.”114  Under this model, local officers are empowered to 
interrogate individuals arrested on state or local charges about their 
citizenship status and to place immigration detainers on arrestees who they 
believe to be eligible for removal.115 
A more recent executive branch program to further collaborate with local 
and state immigration law enforcement is the Secure Communities 
program.116  Launched in 2008, the program requires local jails to share 
fingerprinting data with the federal government, which is then submitted and 
compared to the FBI’s criminal and ICE’s immigrant databases.117  Thus, the 
program alerts the federal government whenever noncitizens are arrested and 
in the custody of local and state law enforcement.118  Even though the federal 
government was explicit that this program would target only high-level 
offenders, many criticized the program, claiming that it was actually intended 
to facilitate the deportation of undocumented immigrants who either lacked 
criminal records altogether or whose criminal record consisted only of minor 
offenses, such as traffic violations.119 
The Secure Communities program has proven instrumental in deportation 
efforts.  By September 2011, ICE reported having received over 11 million 
fingerprint submissions, resulting in almost 700,000 database matches and 
the removal of more than 142,000 people.120  Although the Secure 
Communities program was terminated in 2014 after significant criticism,121 
it was reactivated on January 25, 2017, following the inauguration of 
President Donald Trump.122  Today, ICE reports that since its revival, the 
Secure Communities program has led to the removal of more than 10,290 
“criminal aliens.”123 
3.  The Rise in Local Immigration Regulation 
and Questions of Federal Preemption 
In addition to the federal government’s enlisting of local actors, and 
perhaps in response to it, unprecedented numbers of states and cities have 
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also begun to make their own immigration law and policy.124  In the first six 
months of 2007, for example, over 1400 immigration-related bills were 
introduced, more than 170 of which were enacted in forty-one states.125  This 
was more than triple the number of state immigration laws enacted in the 
entire year of 2005.126  For cities, by July 2007, one source documented over 
250 local ordinances either in existence or under consideration.127  While 
these policies have diverged in their intent and treatment of immigrant 
communities, they are united in that they represent powerful potential 
challenges to the federal monopoly over immigration regulation.128 
Some local immigration laws and ordinances have adopted policies 
seeking to further exclude immigrants from their communities.129  These 
policies take a variety of forms but generally seek to “enforce linguistic 
assimilation”; “deny constitutional and civil rights”; “prohibit ‘illegal 
immigrants’ from accessing public services, housing, and employment”; or 
any combination thereof.130  Examples of such policies include laws 
prohibiting landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants or denying 
business licenses to employers who hire undocumented residents.131  In 
addition, cities have sought to achieve similar exclusionary goals by way of 
facially neutral policies, such as an antiloitering law that targets 
undocumented day laborers who congregate while waiting for work.132  
Through these policies, localities further their role in immigration law 
enforcement indirectly by making life harder for immigrants and making 
them less likely to settle there. 
4.  City Life for Undocumented Immigrant Residents 
The blurring of roles between the federal government and local actors in 
immigration law enforcement poses substantial challenges for city 
communities.133  Scholars and civil rights lawyers argue that these practices 
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increase civil rights violations by police134 and disenfranchise immigrant 
members of the city community—consequences that hurt the public welfare, 
health, and safety of the entire city. 
When undocumented immigrants are scared to interact with law 
enforcement, they become easy targets for criminal activity because their 
attackers know they are unlikely to report the crime.135  One example is the 
domestic violence context, in which “[u]nauthorized alien women across the 
country are battered by spouses who exploit the women’s fear of deportation 
in order to continue the abuse.”136  Undocumented immigrants are also 
frequently targets of scams promising status adjustment or legalization, of 
bribery by corrupt officials, and of labor exploitation by employers.137  Not 
only does a lack of trust deter undocumented immigrants from reporting 
crimes against them, but it also makes it less likely that they will come 
forward to report crimes against others or to cooperate as witnesses.138  This 
hinders local law enforcement’s ability to catch criminals and keep 
communities safe.139  Congress itself has acknowledged this reality by 
creating special visa categories for undocumented-immigrant victims that 
report certain crimes, but these visas have not been able to counteract the 
reporting deterrent already caused by federal policies.140 
Fear of deportation instills a lack of trust in public institutions beyond law 
enforcement, diminishing the public health and welfare of undocumented-
immigrant communities.141  When immigrants with serious and potentially 
contagious health problems are afraid to seek help for fear that hospitals and 
other public health centers will report them, they harm not only themselves, 
but also their family members, coworkers, neighbors, classmates, and any 
others who interact with them.142  Undocumented immigrants may also be 
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less likely to receive routine preventive care, increasing the likelihood that 
they will need to be hospitalized later on.143  In addition, if parents are afraid 
to talk to their children’s teachers and school administrators, this could hurt 
the success of their children, further hindering their ability to succeed and to 
assimilate into U.S. culture.144 
Beyond public health, safety and welfare, critics of the 287(g) and Secure 
Communities programs argue that these programs incentivize officers to stop 
people who “appear” undocumented, leading to increased incidents of racial 
profiling and civil rights violations.145  Although the federal government 
claimed that these programs were intended chiefly to target undocumented 
immigrants with serious criminal convictions,146 a report submitted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to the U.S House of Representatives 
Committee on Homeland Security in 2009 found that many undocumented 
immigrants sent to federal authorities as a result of the 287(g) program had 
actually committed only a minor crime, such as a traffic violation.147  
Utilizing data combined with various investigations throughout the country, 
the ACLU concluded that the 287(g) program was leading to illegal, race-
based immigration law enforcement, including racial profiling.148  Other 
critics of the program argue that ICE does not provide sufficient guidance or 
supervision to local law enforcement and that these programs are costly for 
localities to implement.149 
Under the Obama administration, the federal government itself 
acknowledged the civil rights violations promoted by the Secure 
Communities and 287(g) programs.150  In 2011, a Task Force on Secure 
Communities developed by the Homeland Security Advisory Committee 
issued a report identifying a disparity between the program’s aim to target 
high-level offenders and its practices.151  ICE itself acknowledged this 
finding in its response to the report a year later and announced new 
procedures that would aim to remedy this disparity.152  Despite these 
acknowledgements, however, critics maintained that even under the revised 
 
 143. Id. at 1400 n.126.  
 144. Id. at 1400. 
 145. See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 92, at 1223–33.  
 146. Id. at 1210. 
 147. See ACLU, WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR A HEARING ON EXAMINING 287(G):  THE ROLE 
OF STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT IN IMMIGRATION LAW 6 (2009), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file717_39062.pdf [https://perma.cc/35DN-
X3Z2]. 
 148. Id. at 19–20. 
 149. See The 287(g) Program:  An Overview, supra note 113, at 4–7. 
 150. HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE ON 
SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (2011), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7CG-V7XZ].  
 151. See id. 
 152. ICE OFFICE OF THE DIR., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE RESPONSE TO THE 
TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (Apr. 7, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-response-to-task-force-on-secure-
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL2T-M8MR]. 
2017] AFFIRMATIVE CITY CITIZENSHIP 355 
program, little progress was made in curbing unlawful police practices.153  
Under the Trump administration, known for its tough stance on 
immigration,154 a continued effort at reforming the Secure Communities 
program seems unlikely. 
III.  CITY EXPERIMENTATION 
Given that a wide range of American residents today, including 
undocumented immigrants, face impediments to exercising elements of 
citizenship in the city, what can cities do?  Part III begins with a discussion 
of scholarship addressing this question and argues that existing resolutions 
fail to recognize an affirmative role for cities in the citizenship space, 
regardless of federal immigration law.  It next analyzes the IDNYC program 
to explore whether municipal identification-card programs can offer an 
alternative mechanism for addressing some of the impediments to citizenship 
undocumented city residents face. 
A.  Sanctuary Cities 
One approach adopted by progressive cities in the face of federal 
immigration law has been to adopt noncooperation or “sanctuary city” 
policies.155  While the concept of a sanctuary city actually predates the 
federal immigration law changes of 1986, a sanctuary city today is 
understood to mean a municipality that has refused to partake in actions that 
would contribute to the deportation of its undocumented residents.156  
Sanctuary policies come in a variety of forms, including city council 
resolutions, municipal ordinances, executive orders from city mayors, and 
local law enforcement memoranda.157  Some policies also incorporate 
additional public health and welfare benefits or are simultaneously supported 
by other initiatives, such as educating public service employees on non-
English languages or providing additional benefits to their undocumented 
immigrant residents that would not be available at the federal level.158 
Localities that adopt sanctuary city policies publicly refuse to assist the 
federal government in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.159  Such 
policies have been officially challenged only twice in the courts,160 and 
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neither case established a definitive answer as to their legality.161  In the 
current political climate, the most frequent threat to sanctuary policies comes 
not from the courts, but from state and federal legislators threatening to cut 
or altogether withhold funding to localities that have adopted such 
policies.162  Thus, while proimmigrant sanctuary city policies across the 
country have largely gone unchallenged, their strength remains vulnerable to 
changes in political leadership at both the state and federal levels.163 
Professor Rose Cuison Villazor uses San Francisco’s sanctuary city policy 
to demonstrate how such policies can bestow elements of citizenship on their 
residents.164  Utilizing Bosniak’s multidimensional theory of citizenship,165 
Villazor looks at the ways in which San Francisco’s sanctuary city policy 
managed to promote alternative forms of citizenship for its undocumented 
residents, including what she terms “Citizenship as Rights,” premised on the 
right not to be reported and thus to obtain full access to services within the 
city.166  Villazor also discusses “Citizenship as Public Engagement,” which 
she defines as the right to engage in public discourse167 and “Citizenship as 
Identity,” which she argues extended a sense of identity and belonging to the 
city’s residents.168  By refusing to assist the federal government in 
 
violated its sanctuary city policy); see also Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 
2009) (upholding the constitutionality of the Los Angeles Police Department’s sanctuary city 
policy in the face of a challenge by a city taxpayer).  
 161. For a discussion of the legality of sanctuary city policies, see generally Bill Ong Hing, 
Immigration Sanctuary Policies:  Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and 
Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247 (2012). 
 162. See, e.g., Matthew Burns, Proposal Would Punish ‘Sanctuary Cities’ in N.C., 
WRAL.COM (May 11, 2016), http://www.wral.com/proposal-would-punish-sanctuary-cities-
in-nc/15696381/ [https://perma.cc/B6QH-65MU] (tracking the progress of Senate Bill 868, 
sponsored by North Carolina Senator Buck Newton, which would deny road and school 
funding to any sanctuary cities in the state); see also Alan Neuhauser, Sanctuary Cities Brace 
for Trump Crackdown on Immigration, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 18, 2016), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2016-11-18/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-
trump-crackdown-on-immigration [https://perma.cc/J2TS-MA8E]. 
 163. The most recent presidential election provides a timely example.  During his 
campaign, President Trump vowed to cut all federal funding to sanctuary cities, although he 
failed to detail which policies he would target or to provide an explanation for the legality of 
such an action.  See Neuhauser, supra note 162.  In April 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
announced that the federal government would begin to withhold grant money to cities that do 
not remove barriers to the enforcement of federal immigration law. See Charlie Savage, 
Sanctuary Cities Face Aid Cuts as Justice Dept. Tightens Screws, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/us/politics/sanctuary-city-justice-department.html 
[https://perma.cc/B7SK-MJD4]. A similar order issued by the Trump administration in 
January 2017, however, was recently blocked from going into effect by a California judge who 
determined the order was likely to be found unconstitutional. See Dan Levine, U.S. Judge 
Blocks Trump Order to Restrict Funding for ‘Sanctuary Cities,’ REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2017), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ruling-idUSKBN17R2QO 
[https://perma.cc/CWW5-CS74]. 
 164. Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 573, 575 (2009). 
 165. See supra Part I.B. 
 166. See Villazor, supra note 164, at 592–95. 
 167. Id. at 595–97. 
 168. Id. at 597. 
2017] AFFIRMATIVE CITY CITIZENSHIP 357 
immigration law enforcement, sanctuary cities bestow elements of 
citizenship on their undocumented city residents.169 
Sanctuary city policies undoubtedly present a mechanism for cities to 
support their undocumented immigrant residents.  However, such policies 
remain vulnerable to changing political landscapes, as the recent election of 
President Donald Trump has demonstrated.170  Scholarship focused on 
sanctuary city policies neglects to consider how cities can and do promote 
the inclusion of all residents, including undocumented immigrant residents, 
while remaining within the purview of city power.171  Municipal 
identification programs represent such an alternate possibility. 
B.  New York City’s IDNYC Program 
As discussed in the Introduction, progressive cities across the country have 
begun to experiment with making a city identification card available to all 
city residents, irrespective of immigration status.172  One such experiment is 
New York City’s IDNYC program, which launched in January 2015 and 
which, as of March 31, 2017, has over 1 million enrollees.173  As the largest 
municipal identification program in the country,174 IDNYC offers a useful 
lens through which to analyze city identification-card programs generally.  
The problems New York City sought to remedy through IDNYC, its core 
features, challenges that arose during its design and implementation phases, 
and early data from the program’s mixed-methods evaluation175 all speak to 
the strength of these programs as city policy on a broader scale. 
1.  Overview of IDNYC 
Creating a municipal identification-card program was part of Mayor Bill 
de Blasio’s campaign and became an immediate priority when he assumed 
office.176  The bill, Introduction 253, was signed into law in July 2015 and 
shortly afterwards, Mayor de Blasio issued an order designating the New 
York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) to administer the 
program.177  HRA released proposed regulations which underwent a period 
of notice and comment rulemaking and were ultimately issued in final form 
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in November 2014.178  The card officially became available to New Yorkers 
and within weeks, interest in the card so exceeded expectations that the city 
had to create what they called “pop-up” enrollment centers—additional 
short-term registration areas—in places with high demand.179 
To apply for an IDNYC card, applicants are required to show proof of 
identity and address, which can be satisfied in part using foreign 
identification documents including a non-U.S. passport, driver’s license, or 
consular identification card.180  Applicants are not asked about their 
immigration status, and the application information on the IDNYC website 
is available in over thirty languages.181  Once obtained, the New York City 
Police Department, city agencies, and public buildings consider the IDNYC 
card an acceptable form of identification.182  The card also functions as a 
library card, can be synced to the New York City Health and Hospitals 
medical records database, and provides prescription drug benefits and 
discounts at various gyms and entertainment centers throughout the city.183  
In addition, over forty cultural institutions offer free or discounted 
memberships to cardholders, and over a dozen banks and credit unions accept 
the card as proof of identity when cardholders apply to open a bank 
account.184 
2.  IDNYC’s Legislative History and Amendments Since Launch 
The legislative history of IDNYC reveals that the program’s chief aim was 
to help New York City residents who needed a valid form of 
identification185—a need the city discovered was widespread.186  While this 
undeniably applied to undocumented immigrants living in the city, of which 
there are an estimated 525,000,187 a committee report on Introduction 253 
also discusses many other groups of New Yorkers who are frequently unable 
to obtain a valid form of identification, including homeless residents, 
formerly incarcerated residents, youths, elderly people, and members of the 
LGBTQ community.188  For example, the report states: 
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LGBTQ youth who are rejected by their family because of their sexual 
orientation and gender identity may end up homeless without any 
documentation to establish their identity.  In New York State, the average 
age at which lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth become homeless is 14 and 
the average age that transgender youth become homeless is 13.  The 
problems for transgender youth are often exacerbated.  Like transgender 
adults, transgender youth struggle when trying to obtain appropriate 
identification that accurately reflects their gender.189 
Not having proper identification proved to be a significant barrier for New 
Yorkers seeking to access a variety of services and even buildings within the 
city.190   The report points out that identification is often required to access 
buildings, receive medical care, get prescriptions, and open a bank 
account.191 
The widespread lack of identification card was also a challenge for the 
New York City Police Department whose officers are not permitted to issue 
summonses—even for low level violations such as riding a bike in violation 
of traffic rules or disorderly conduct—to anyone without an identification 
card.192  The report further notes that “[p]eople rely on identification for a 
myriad of reasons, including . . . for their own self-esteem.”193  Testimony 
from the hearing on Introduction 253 before the New York City Council 
Committee on Immigration provides further evidence of this need, as 
representatives from a wide range of organizations representing different 
localities within the city as well as different constituents including 
immigrants, the homeless, LGBTQ communities, and domestic violence 
victims, articulated support for the program.194 
Throughout the program’s rollout and implementation, IDNYC program 
leaders learned just how great the need for identification was.195  As 
previously mentioned, interest in the card far exceeded expectations and 
program leaders had to work quickly to expand their enrollment capacity.196  
In addition, the first year of the program’s existence shed light on the extent 
of the need in additional communities and groups.197  According to Deputy 
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Director of Policy Sam Solomon from the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant 
Affairs, one of the city’s first-year observations was that some disconnected 
New York City youths need identification because they live apart from their 
families but are too young to get a driver’s license.198  This need is reflected 
in the amendments to the rules adopted in early 2016, which include an 
expanded definition of “caretaker,” enabling underage residents to more 
easily meet the four-point identification requirement.199 
Even as the city recognized that the need for identification did not lie solely 
within the city’s immigrant population, IDNYC’s marketing materials make 
clear that the program also has a purpose tied to undocumented 
immigrants.200  For example, one of the stated goals of the program was to 
keep the card “stigma-free” so that the card would not immediately be 
associated with documentation status.201  In his statements to the public 
relating to IDNYC, Mayor de Blasio has also emphasized the importance of 
the card for the immigrant community.202 
3.  City-Specific Adjustments 
During the design and implementation phases of the IDNYC program, 
adjustments made to the program demonstrate that the city was ideally 
situated to remove the barriers identified, as many of them were New York 
City-specific.203  According to Solomon, while doing research for the 
program, the city discovered that almost half of the adults living in New York 
City do not have a New York State driver’s license.204  Recognizing this 
helped to explain why the need for an identification card in New York City 
was so vast and the kinds of identification materials New York City residents 
were likely (or unlikely) to have when applying for a card.205  These distinct 
characteristics were also factored into the city’s marketing and outreach 
efforts and placement of pop-up centers.206 
According to Solomon, size is another difference between New York City 
and other cities whose municipal identification-card programs they looked to 
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as a model.207  For example, New Haven’s identification program is 
administered out of one central building, a model that would have been 
impossible to imitate in New York City.208  It would not have been 
reasonable, Solomon pointed out, to ask someone to come from the Bronx to 
New York City’s city hall in downtown Manhattan, and, if the program had 
expected such of its applicants, it likely would not have had anywhere near 
as many enrollees as it did.209  Ultimately, the city established eleven 
permanent enrollment centers and six nonpublic centers across the five 
boroughs.210 
Another challenge for the IDNYC program arose from the vast array of 
diverse languages spoken by New York City’s residents.211  Whereas in New 
Haven, the population being served by its municipal identification program 
was largely Spanish speaking, Solomon pointed out that only providing 
application materials in English and Spanish would have excluded a huge 
portion of New York City’s residents.212  As proof of this challenge, 
IDNYC’s website offers a manual detailing the IDNYC application process 
in over thirty languages.213  According to Solomon, even with so many 
options, there are times when the IDNYC coordinators need to use language 
interpreters to meet the needs of an applicant.214 
4.  Banks and Document Retention:  Challenges to Be Determined 
IDNYC has faced challenges since its launch.  One of the most well-
publicized challenges has been the program’s early struggle to get the 
cooperation and support of the city’s financial institutions.215  IDNYC made 
the decision not to incorporate a debit card into its identification card, as other 
programs have, and to focus instead on partnering with banks in the city so 
that cardholders could set up bank accounts, a practice which encourages 
long-term savings.216  Despite this goal, many of the largest banks and 
financial institutions in the city, including Bank of America and J.P. Morgan, 
refused to accept the IDNYC card as proof of identification, citing federal 
antifraud laws.217  Even after federal regulators formally approved the 
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IDNYC card as acceptable identification to open a bank account, many banks 
continued to refuse, and Mayor de Blasio cannot compel them to accept the 
card.218 
The refusal of major banks to accept the IDNYC card proved functionally 
and optically problematic.219  Currently, thirteen banks and credit unions in 
New York City accept IDNYC as a primary form of identification to open a 
bank account.220  However, misinformation surrounding which banks would 
accept the card in the early stages of the card’s implementation caused 
confusion and even embarrassment for some IDNYC cardholders who found 
themselves turned away from banks when trying to use their IDNYC as 
identification.221 
More recently, IDNYC has also faced challenges to its document retention 
policy.222  This policy empowers HRA to destroy application documents after 
two years if it determines that keeping the documents is no longer necessary 
and to reassess and make any changes to the policy that the agency deems 
necessary at the two-year mark.223  The policy was built into the program as 
a way to ensure security, verify identify, and to provide an opportunity for 
review of the necessity of such retention in light of the need to protect the 
privacy of applicants.224 
Shortly before the end of 2016, when the underlying documents used to 
demonstrate identity and eligibility were to be destroyed, two Republican 
members of the New York State Assembly, Ron Castorina Jr. and Nicole 
Malliotakis, filed a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request for all 
IDNYC applicant records.225  When their request was denied, they filed suit, 
and on April 3, 2017, a Staten Island judge denied the request and refused to 
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order the city to produce the records.226  Although an appeal of this decision 
was recently dismissed, Castorina and Mallitakis have since filed a second 
suit.227  Although this case is still pending, lawyers for the city maintain that 
the document request is unnecessary and inappropriate under state law, a 
statement supported by the New York State Attorney General.228 
Beyond these two issues, the program has not faced significant opposition, 
interference, or challenges of preemption.229  Following the launch of 
IDNYC, one New York State legislator sponsored a bill that would prohibit 
municipalities from creating municipal identification cards, but it was never 
passed.230 
Despite these challenges, the IDNYC program has managed to 
continuously expand the number of cardholders enrolled in the program and 
the benefits associated with the card.231  Data from the Mayor’s Office of 
Immigrant Affairs and media reports also indicate that the program has been 
successful in reaching and enrolling the immigrant community.232 
IV.  THE CITY TRANSFORMED 
The case study analysis of New York City’s IDNYC program reveals that 
cities can bestow a form of citizenship—Affirmative City Citizenship—on 
their residents.  Part IV draws on lessons from New York City’s experiment 
to draw broader conclusions about the strengths and limits of Affirmative 
City Citizenship as a means for progressive cities to support their 
undocumented immigrant residents. 
A.  Affirmative City Citizenship 
Through its IDNYC program, New York City became an actor in the 
citizenship space.  The problems the city identified associated with a lack of 
identification, including an inability to enter public buildings or to interact 
easily with law enforcement,233 are not mere inconveniences.  Instead, they 
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directly correlate with many of the key elements of multidimensional 
citizenship identified by Bosniak and others, such as the right to participate 
in local politics; the confidence to fully engage with city services, cultural 
centers, and law enforcement; and the simple ability to feel like a welcome 
member of the community.234 
By offering an identification card that facilitates access to banks, city 
agencies, public buildings, cultural centers, and law enforcement, New York 
City opens pathways to civic participation and engagement that can be 
blocked for even U.S. citizens.  Beyond undocumented immigrants, New 
York City found a need for identification among various other groups, 
including the city’s homeless, elderly, and LGBTQ youth population.235  
Without an identification card, these groups cannot attend a meeting in city 
hall or open a bank account.236  The IDNYC program not only removes these 
barriers, but it also sends a message to the members of these groups, many of 
whom are marginalized from city life for a variety of reasons, that their 
participation matters.  In doing so, New York City bestows a form of 
citizenship on its residents. 
This citizenship bestowed onto New Yorkers by the IDNYC program is 
“affirmative” because it is not crafted solely with the aim of resisting federal 
immigration policy.  Instead, Affirmative City Citizenship proactively “adds 
on” to the existing rights and privileges of all city residents, regardless of 
their legal standing with the federal government.237  In this way, Affirmative 
City Citizenship policies are distinct from other proimmigrant local policies 
because they do not embrace a policy of noncooperation toward the federal 
government.  These policies treat undocumented status as just one of many 
factors that can act as a barrier to city life, and in doing so, they allow for a 
more peaceable coexistence with federal law. 
How does this Affirmative City Citizenship stand up against a lawful 
immigration status conferred by the federal government?  The short answer 
is that it does not.   Local efforts at supporting undocumented immigrants can 
never replace or be a substitute for a lawful status bestowed by the federal 
government.  Even so, there are reasons to believe that Affirmative City 
Citizenship is a powerful tool to support undocumented immigrant city 
residents.  First, because local governments exercise power over the areas of 
governance most immediately related to daily life,238 the impact of city 
policies that improve access to these services for undocumented immigrant 
residents is likely to be significant.  Second, because goals such as building 
a relationship of trust with local government and law enforcement are central 
to effective local governance,239 cities have leeway to address these issues 
while still falling within traditional city powers.  Affirmative City Citizenship 
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policies, then, are strong in the face of legal challenges or attempted 
interference by state or local actors. 
Affirmative City Citizenship policies are not only legally strong but also 
justified for two reasons.  First, the federal government’s refusal to 
comprehensively address the large undocumented immigration population 
has created serious challenges for city governments seeking to protect the 
public health, welfare, and safety of their constituents.240  Second, accepting 
the assertion that rights require local adaptation,241 local governments will 
always be critical to ensuring that rights transition from ideals to realities.  
Since local governments legislate in the closest proximity to their 
constituents,242 cities may have an inherent obligation to enact policies that 
promote rights and civic engagement, regardless of federal policies. 
B.  Limitations of Affirmative City Citizenship 
While Affirmative City Citizenship is powerful in its own right, it is not a 
substitute for legal citizenship status.  As Part II demonstrated,243 many of 
the challenges faced by undocumented immigrants in the city space arise out 
of a fear that interacting with city institutions and services will result in their 
prosecution and deportation.  While Affirmative City Citizenship can seek to 
overcome this boundary by providing a discreet way for undocumented 
immigrants to interact with city institutions, the importance of federal 
comprehensive immigration reform and legal pathways to citizenship cannot 
be overstated. 
The importance of trust with city officials for effective Affirmative City 
Citizenship policies also hints that their success among undocumented 
immigrants is reliant, in part, on a coexistence with sanctuary city policies.  
While nothing in municipal identification-card policies relate to the 
enforcement of immigration laws, IDNYC’s goal of trust with local law 
enforcement would have been significantly harder to achieve if New York 
City did not have a long history of declining to conduct immigration 
enforcement and taking actions to protect its immigrant residents.244  In spite 
of this history, IDNYC’s evaluation found that “the single greatest reason 
people hesitated to get the ID was related to concerns that it was being used 
to monitor New Yorkers.”245  Thus, if New York City had not had such a 
longstanding proimmigrant stance, it would be even less likely that 
undocumented immigrants would feel safe turning over their documents to 
apply for an identification card. 
Since this Note has focused on a city with both types of policies in place, 
the extent of these identification-card programs’ reliance on sanctuary city 
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policies cannot be conclusively determined.  Such a finding, however, simply 
leads to the conclusion that cities contemplating adopting municipal 
identification-card programs as a means of helping undocumented 
immigrants should do so together with other policies that promote a sense of 
trust with local government and law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Cities today play a central role in the lives of American residents, citizen 
and noncitizen alike.  As spaces where residents exercise many of the 
elements of multidimensional citizenship, the city can promote citizenship 
for all residents, regardless of immigration status.  New York City’s IDNYC 
program aims to do just that.  In doing so, it becomes an actor in the 
citizenship space.  The Affirmative City Citizenship it creates challenges 
traditional understandings of legal citizenship and offers a promising way for 
local governments to support their undocumented immigrant residents. 
From the inception of this Note through the time of its publication, the 
environment surrounding U.S. immigration law and policy has changed 
drastically.  Sanctuary cities now face immediate threats to their federal 
funding and the goal of achieving comprehensive immigration reform seems 
even less likely than under the Obama administration.  This changing 
political climate has undoubtedly increased the vulnerability of the 
undocumented immigrant population.  It follows that cities seeking to support 
their undocumented immigrant residents must be more committed now than 
ever. 
 
